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THE CELOTEXINITIAL BURDEN STANDARD AND
AN OPPORTUNITY TO "REVIVIFY" RULE 56
Brooke D. Coleman'
I. INTRODUCTION
Summary judgment, which started as an obscure procedural rule, is now
a standard part of the litigation process. The percentage of federal cases ended
by summary judgment increased from 3.7% in 1975 to 7.7% in 2000.'
Researchers have also quantified a corresponding decrease in bench and jury
trials. In 1962, 11.5% of federal cases were resolved by trial.2 By 2002, that
percentage had fallen to 1.8%. The prominence of summary judgment in our
legal system is undeniable.
In response, commentators have vigorously debated the constitutionality,
efficiency, and fairness of summary judgment.4 This dialogue, while a
* Brooke D. Coleman is a Fellow at Stanford Law School. This article would not have been written
without critical input and thought from Norman Spaulding and Deborah Hensler. Thanks also to
Stanford Law Fellows John Greenman, Stephen Lee, Hillel Levin, and Nirej Sekhon for their
invaluable support, sharp wit, and inspiration. Finally, thank you to the District Court for the
Northern District of California for its generous grant of a PACER waiver.
1. Federal Judicial Center (Donna Stienstra and Patricia Lombard) Memorandum to Chief Judges, U.S.
District Courts, Graphs for Panel Discussion on the Role of the Judge, April 30, 2003, chart labeled
"Percent of Civil Cases Filed Each Year That Were Disposed of by a Judgment at Trial." See also
Joe S. Cecil, Dean P. Miletich & George Cort, Trends in Summary Judgment Practice: A Preliminary
Analysis, Division of Research: Federal Judicial Center, available at
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/summjudg.pdf/$file/summjudg.pdf (Nov. 2001)(In a
targeted study of six federal district courts, finding that summary judgment filings increased from
12% in 1975 to 19% in 1988; percentage of cases with one or more motions granted in whole or in
part increased from 6% in 1975 to 12% in 2000; and the percentage of cases terminated by summary
judgment increased from 3.7% in 1975 to 7.7% in 2000).
2. See Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal
and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 460 (2004).
3. Id. Another study found that the number of jury and nonjury trials decreased from approximately
2,750 and 4,400, respectively, in 1997 to 1,500 and 2,900 in 2002. Frederic N. Smalkin and Frederic
N.C. Smalkin, The Market for Justice, the "Litigation Explosion, " and the "Verdict Bubble ": A
Closer Look at Vanishing Trials, 2005 FED. CTS. L. REv. 8, table 1 (2005).
4. See, e.g., Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the "Litigation Explosion, " "Liability
Crisis, " and Efficiency Cliches Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 982 (2003) (evaluating the impact of the summary judgment procedure on litigation in
America); Suja A. Thomas, Why Summary Judgment Is Unconstitutional, 93 VA. L. REv. 139 (2007)
(as suggested in the title, the author argues that summary judgment is unconstitutional); Jeffrey W.
Stempel, A Distorted Mirror: The Supreme Court's Shimmering View ofSummary Judgment, Directed
Verdict, and the Adjudication Process, 49 OHIO ST. L. J. 95 (1988) (criticizing the court for its trilogy
of cases); Jack Achiezer Guggenheim, In Summary It Makes Sense: A Proposal to Substantially
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critically important contribution to academic literature, has taken place on a
theoretical plane. In other words, scholarship to date has theorized about the
consequences of summary judgment without systematically studying how the
summary judgment process actually works.
This article addresses this gap by looking closely at the rule announced
in one of the most well known summary judgment cases: Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett.5 In Celotex, the defendant moved for summary judgment on an issue
that the plaintiff bore the burden of proving at trial. Instead of providing
affirmative evidence to negate plaintiffs claim, defendant referred to two
interrogatories in the record and asserted that plaintiff could not prove her
case.6 The Court held that a defendant does not have to proffer affirmative
evidence to carry its initial burden in this context.7 By allowing the defendant
to move based on an "assertion" and not requiring affirmative evidence, the
Court announced a new "initial burden standard" for defendants moving for
summary judgment.'
When Celotex was published, a debate about the consequences of the
initial burden standard began. That dialogue continues today. Many critics
argue that the decision wreaks havoc on plaintiffs. Chief among the critics'
concerns is that defendants can file one-page motions and need not engage in
discovery. In contrast, proponents of summary judgment laud the decision as
a necessary step in achieving an efficient pre-litigation process. Defendants
Expand the Role of Summary Judgment in Nonjury Cases, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 319 (2006) (arguing
that summary judgment has proved to be so efficient, its use should be expanded). In addition, law
and economic academics have studied summary judgment with a view toward predicting litigation
and settlement behaviors. See Samuel Issacharoff& George Loewenstein, Second Thoughts About
Summary Judgment, 100 YALE L. J. 73, 78 (1990) (arguing that summary judgment discourages
settlement); John Bronsteen, Against Summary Judgment, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 522 (2007)
(arguing that summary judgment increases the cost of litigation by discouraging early settlement).
5. 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
6. While it is certainly not always the case in summary judgment motions, I will refer to moving parties
as "defendant(s)" and nonmoving parties as "plaintiff(s)." This is quite often the party structure, and
the terms are less cumbersome than "movant" and "nonmovant."
7. At least one commentator has described the decision in Celotex as follows: "The distinction is
between the movant's saying, 'I can disprove it,' and saying to the opponent, 'You cannot prove it.'
The former had always been an acceptable basis for a motion for summary judgment; the issue in
Celotex was whether the latter was also acceptable." Judy M. Comett, The Legacy of Byrd v. Hall:
Gossiping About Summary Judgment in Tennessee, 69 TENN. L. REV. 175, 179 (200 1).
8. As used in this article, the "initial burden standard" means the standard that applies when the
defendant moves for summary judgment on the grounds that the plaintiff does not have requisite
evidence to prove its case. In this instance, the defendant does not present its own affirmative
evidence to support this contention, but instead argues against the sufficiency of the evidence
introduced by the plaintiff. There are a number of cases where, also under Celotex, the defendant
moves and presents its own affirmative evidence to show that there is no material issue of fact.
Moving based on affirmative evidence is not controversial, and I will not address it here.
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are not required to take unnecessary procedural steps before putting plaintiff's
case to the test. They argue that any potential abuses by defendants can be
staved off by other procedural rules such as Rule 11, which governs attorney
sanctions.
This article is the first to systematically evaluate whether these responses
to Celotex are accurate. Using real cases, I consider whether the alleged
consequences of Celotex materialized, or whether, as proponents of summary
judgment argued and continue to argue, the system is now simply more
efficient. Using this data, I also make a broader critique about how the
academy should think about critiquing procedural rules.
I begin in Part II of the article by reviewing the genesis and development
of the summary-judgment process in our legal system and by looking at how
the Celotex initial burden standard has been received by courts and academics.
In Part III, I assess these responses to the initial burden standard by reviewing
two new sets of data-a broad survey of published and unpublished district and
appellate court cases and a focused survey of district court cases from a single
federal district court. My findings consistently show that those who critique
the Celotex initial burden standard have not accurately forecasted how
defendants would respond to the change and those who support it, while not
fully vindicated, are correct in arguing that other procedural rules may cabin
defendants' actions. Next, in Part IV, I consider why so many commentators
have misconstrued the practical consequences of a case like Celotex. I argue
that the mistaken responses to Celotex are due to a failure to account for the
complexity of federal litigation (e.g., appreciating the impact of related federal
rules and the realities of human behavior). To critique the rules without taking
these real-world considerations into account is to do them a great disservice.
Finally, informed by my data's descriptive results and my proposal for
methodological innovation in critiquing the rules, I argue that an unambiguous
statement of the initial burden standard should be added to the text of Rule 56.
II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT: A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
A. Pre-Celotex Summary Judgment
Summary judgment in the American legal system was codified by the
federal rulemaking process. Before 1938, there were no uniform federal rules
of procedure.9 Courts and attorneys used local rules that varied from
9. PROCEDURE-THE HANDMAID OF JUSTICE: ESSAYS OF CHARLES E. CLARK 85, 88 (Charles Alan
Wright & Harry M. Reasoner eds., 1965).
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jurisdiction to jurisdiction. However, by 1934, influential groups like the
American Bar Association and individuals like Homer Cummings, the
Attorney General at the time, began calling for uniform procedural rules. In
response, Congress passed the Enabling Act, which provided for a standard set
of federal rules.' 0
Under the Enabling Act, the Court appointed the first Advisory
Committee-a committee designated to draft uniform federal rules of
procedure. William D. Mitchell chaired the committee and Judge (then-
Professor) Charles E. Clark served as the Reporter." From 1935 to 1937, the
Advisory Committee, which also included eminent legal figures such as former
Attorney General George W. Wickersham, worked to craft an extensive set of
procedural rules. The Advisory Committee officially met five times in this
two-year period to draft the rules, send them out for comment from the bench
and bar, and revise the rules according to such comments. 2 Ultimately, on
September 16, 1938, the rules became effective.
The summary judgment rule was an integral part of the 1938 rule
package due in large part to the Advisory Committee's Reporter, Judge Clark.
Widely considered the father of federal civil procedure, Judge Clark
profoundly influenced the place of summary judgment in pretrial practice. He
believed that the new uniform liberal pleading rules would be abused if not
cabined by a procedure like summary judgment. 13 While acknowledging that
10. 28 U.S.C. § 723(c) (1934), as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1988). The rulemaking process did not
start immediately. In 1935, former Attorney General William D. Mitchell addressed the Supreme
Court in an open letter, see William D. Mitchell, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, in DAVID
DUDLEY FIELD, CENTENARY ESSAYS 73, 76-78 (1949), and Chief Justice Evans Hughes's addressed
the American Law Institute to point out the lack of activity under the Enabling Act and call for quick
action. The Chief Justice explicitly pledged to accept responsibility under the rulemaking statute by
acting to unify law and equity under one set of rules. See "Dramatic Pronouncement by Chief Justice
Hughes," 19 J. AM. JuD. Soc'y 3, 5 (1935).
11. Minutes of Committee Meeting, June 20, 1935, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/
CR06-1935-min.pdf (last visited Feb. 29, 2008). The original Advisory Committee worked on
myriad of rules, primarily rules of civil procedure. However, at its first meetings, the Committee
determined that it could address rules of appellate procedure, evidence, and criminal procedure.
Under Chief Justice Earl Warren, the committee system was restructured to consist of one supervising
"standing committee" and five subordinate advisory committees (admiralty, appellate, bankruptcy,
civil, and criminal). Eventually, the admiralty and civil committees merged, and an evidence
committee was created.
12. Id.
13. Wright & Reasoner, supra note 9, at 145-46. Clark wrote:
It is obvious that judges should be careful not to grant judgment against one who
shows a genuine issue as to a material fact. Just as obvious is the obligation to
examine a case with care to see that a trial is not forced upon a litigant by one with
no case at all. The very freedom permitted by the simplified pleadings of the modern
practice is subject to abuse unless it is checked by the devices looking to the
summary disclosure of the merits if the case is to continue to trial. Those are
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a meritorious case should proceed to trial, Judge Clark noted in a later writing
that "[a] court has failed in granting justice when it forces a party to an
expensive trial of several weeks' duration to meet purely formal allegations
without substance fully as much as when it improperly refuses to hear a case
at all.' 14 Relying not on any explicit rule criteria, Judge Clark put his faith in
the "common sense" and "good judgment" of the bench to carry out the
delicate balance called for under the new rule. 5
However, the common-sense courts to which Judge Clark referred did not
readily embrace summary judgment. This is largely because summary
judgment had no substantial historical grounding in the American legal
system. The procedure originated in England, where the Bills of Exchange
Act of 1855 applied a summary judgment process to a small category of
cases. 6 Even these procedures did not take a strong hold. In the American
legal system, while a number of states adopted the procedure before 1938, the
practice was not common.' 7
In addition to the lack of historical grounding, many judges simply did
not view the summary judgment rule-and the specifics of how it was to work
-as a good thing. Courts struggled with the perceived loss of fundamental
rights such as a trial by jury and the right to confront witnesses.' 8 In response,
courts often rejected the explicit summary judgment standard by reading a
discovery, summary judgment, and pre-trial - all necessary correlatives of each other
and of a system which may permit concealment of the weakness of a case in the
generalized pleadings of the present day. Refusal of summary disposal of the case
may be a real hardship on the more deserving of the litigants; since appeal does not
lie from refusal, as it does from the grant, the penalties may be the severer.
Id.
14. Id. at 146.
15. Id. ("What is needed is the application of common sense, good judgment, and decisive action, on the
one hand, not to shut a deserving litigant from his trial and, on the other, not to allow harassment of
an equally deserving suitor for immediate relief by a long and worthless trial. Formulas or cichds
will not help, and the announcement of rolling precedents will only embarrass in the future.")
16. The procedure primarily applied to contract cases involving liquidated damages. Charles E. Clark
& Charles U. Samenow, The Summary Judgment, 38 YALE L.J. 423,425 (1929). From the beginning,
however, summary judgment was viewed as a way to achieve efficiency within any particular legal
system by working to remedy "law's delay." Id. at 423. The purpose of summary judgment was "to
preserve the court from frivolous defenses, and to defeat attempts to use formal pleading as means
to delay the recovery ofjust demands." Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. United States, 187 U.S. 315, 320
(1902).
17. Clark & Samenow, supra note 16, at 440-71. Not surprisingly, the Supreme Court addressed the
constitutionality of summary judgment at the state level only once before the procedure became a part
of the federal rules. See Issacharoff& Loewenstein, supra note 4, at 798.
18. Marcy J. Levine, Summary Judgment: The Majority View Undergoes a Complete Reversal in the
1986 Supreme Court, 37 EMORY L.J. 171, 173-80 (1988).
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stricter standard into the rule. Specifically, some courts denied motions for
summary judgment when there was the "slightest doubt" as to the facts. 9
Judge Clark denounced courts' obfuscation of the explicit language of the
rule as "ad hoc legislation," which was "dangerous in the [present] case" and
"disturbing to the general procedure."20  Following these criticisms, the
Judicial Conference called for "attention to the value of 'the related
provisions' of the discovery and summary judgment rules" and "urged the
promotion of their use by the district judges.",2' For decades, however, federal
courts continued to reject summary judgment as a common procedure. This
all quickly changed, however, once the infamous "trilogy of cases" was
announced.
19. See Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2nd Cir. 1946). The Second Circuit panel consisted of
Judge Learned Hand, Judge Jerome N. Frank (who wrote the majority opinion), and Judge Charles
Clark (who wrote a scathing dissenting opinion). In reversing the trial court's grant of summary
judgment, the court asked whether "there is the slightest doubt as to the facts." In support of its
decision to find such doubt, the court cited the Supreme Court's opinion in Associated Press v. United
States, 326 U.S. 1, 6 (1945), where the Court stated, "We agree that Rule 56 should be cautiously
invoked to the end that the parties may always be afforded a trail where there is a bona fide dispute
of facts between them." Arnstein 154 F.2d at 470 n.16. The Second Circuit stated: "We do not
believe that, in a case in which the decision must turn on the reliability of witnesses, the Supreme
Court, by authorizing summary judgments, intended to permit a 'trial by affidavits,' if either party
objects. That procedure which, so the historians tell us, began to be outmoded at common law in the
16th century, would, if now revived, often favor unduly the party with the more ingenious and better
paid lawyer. Grave injustice might easily result." Id. at 471. Judge Clark responded by arguing that
this decision was "one of those procedural mountains which develop where it is thought that justice
must be temporarily sacrificed, lest a mistaken precedent be set at large." Id. at 479 (Clark, J.,
dissenting). He added that the court's action "is a novel method of amending rules of procedure. It
subverts the plans and hopes of the profession for careful, informed study leading to the adoption and
to the amendment of simple rules which shall be uniform throughout the country." Id. at 479; see also
Levine, supra note 18, at 174-80. Levine provides a detailed account of the intellectual disagreement
between these Second Circuit judges.
20. Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 479 (Clark, J., dissenting).
21. Wright & Reasoner, supra note 9, at 144; see also Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 480. Judge Clark noted that
summary judgment:
is, indeed, more necessary in the system of simple pleading now enforced
in the federal courts; for under older procedures, useless and unnecessary
trials could be avoided, in theory at least, by the then existing demurrer
and motion practice. But that stressed pleading forms, rather than the
merits, while summary judgment and its popular correlative, pre-trial
procedure, [Fed.R.Civ.P.] 16, go directly to the merits. One unfortunate
consequence of eliminating summary procedure is that it affords support
for the plea of return to the old demurrer, which, however clumsily, did
get rid of some of the cases which did not deserve a protracted and
expensive trial.
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B. Celotex, Matsushita, & Anderson: The "Trilogy"
The Court decided three important summary judgment cases in 1986:
Celotex, Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,22 and
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. Some commentators argue that before the
trilogy, courts were using summary judgment more frequently.24 However,
even if a trend toward the use of summary judgment had begun, the fact that
three opinions in a single term so squarely dealt with the same issue was, as
one commentator put it, "striking. 25 I will, therefore, summarize the cases,
giving more time to a discussion of Celotex and providing a brief contextual
overview of Matsushita and Liberty Lobby.
In Celotex, plaintiff Myrtle Nell Catrett, the administratix of the estate of
her deceased husband, sued defendant Celotex Corporation and fourteen other
26Shalee
asbestos companies. She alleged that her husband died because of exposure
to asbestos and claimed negligence, breach of warranty, and strict liability
against the defendants.27 In September 1981, Celotex filed a motion for
summary judgment, arguing that Catrett could not show that "any [Celotex]
product.., was the proximate cause" of her husband's injuries.28 Specifically,
Celotex asserted that in her answers to its interrogatories, Catrett failed to
"identify... any witnesses who could testify about the decedent's exposure
to petitioner's asbestos products. 29  While Celotex could have provided
affirmative evidence of its own such as records showing that Catrett did not
work in any facilities where Celotex products were used, it chose not to.
Instead, it baldly asserted that Catrett did not have requisite evidence and
referred only to the record before the trial court.
In response, Catrett produced three documents: (1) the transcript of her
late husband's deposition; (2) a letter from one of her late husband's
employers whom she planned to call as a trial witness; and (3) a letter from an
insurance company to Celotex's attorney.30 She argued these documents
22. 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
23. 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
24. Melissa L. Nelken, One Step Forward, Two Steps Back: Summary Judgment After Celotex, 40
HASTINGS L.J. 53 (1988); Stempel, supra note 4, at 160 (arguing that Rule 56 was used "frequently
and often" before the trilogy of cases and that cases like Liberty Lobby simply made the summary
judgment process more pro-defendant).
25. Miller, supra note 4, at 1029.
26. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 319.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 319-20 (quotations omitted).
29. Id. at 320.
30. Id.
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showed that her late husband had been exposed to Celotex's asbestos products
in Chicago between 1970-71.3' In response, Celotex argued the documents
were inadmissible hearsay and, therefore, could not be considered in
opposition to its motion.32 The district court agreed and granted the motion.3
Catrett appealed.34
The appellate court for the District of Columbia reversed the district court
holding that Celotex failed to "adduce any evidence, in the form of affidavits
or otherwise, to support its motion. 35 The appellate court felt constrained by
the Court's decision in Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co.,36 which it reasoned
"establish[ed] that the party opposing the motion for summaryjudgment bears
the burden of responding only after the moving party has met its burden of
coming forward with proof of the absence of any genuine issues of material
fact. '37  The appellate court did not reach the issue of whether Catrett's
evidence could be considered because it found that Celotex did not meet its
initial burden for summary judgment; therefore, Catrett was under no
obligation to come forward with evidence under Rule 56.38 Notably, Judge
Bork dissented, arguing that "[t]he majority errs in supposing that a party
seeking summary judgment must always make an affirmative evidentiary
showing, even in cases where there is not a triable, factual dispute."39
The Supreme Court rejected the majority and agreed with Judge Bork's
description of the initial burden.4" Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the
majority, wrote that summary judgment should be granted "after adequate time
for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing
sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case,
and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial."' The Court
determined that the moving party's "initial responsibility of informing the
district court of the basis for its motion" would be satisfied by "identifying
those portions of 'the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any,' which it believes
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 321 (quotations omitted) (emphasis in original).
36. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970).
37. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 321 (citing Catrett v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 756 F.2d 181, 184 (D.C. Cir.
1985)) (quotations omitted) (emphasis in original).
38. Id. at 322.
39. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 756 F.2d at 188 (Bork, J., dissenting), rev'dsub nom; Celotex, 477 U.S.
317(1986).
40. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.
41. Id.
[Vol. 32
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demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. ' '42 The majority
further explained that when the nonmoving party has the burden on a claim at
trial, "the burden on the moving party [at summary judgment] may be
discharged by 'showing'-that is, pointing out to the district court-that there
is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case., 43 Rejecting
the appellate court's determination that Celotex had to support its motion with
"affidavits or other similar materials negating the opponents claim," the Court
read Rule 56(c)'s language "the affidavits, if any" to suggest the absence of
any such requirement." The Court noted that "[o]ne of the principal purposes
of the summary judgment rule is to isolate and dispose of factually
unsupported claims or defenses." '5 To achieve this goal, the Court determined
that Rule 56 did not require a defendant to come forward with evidence
affirmatively negating an element of plaintiff' s claim in order to meet its initial
burden.46
This decision was viewed with great disdain by many academics and
practitioners. First, the majority failed to detail how the defendant would
technically meets its burden in this context.47 Second, many viewed this
decision as a sea of change and a rejection of the Court's previously
announced initial burden standard under Adickes.4 ' Finally, and most
importantly, the Court made clear that summary judgment was a viable
procedure.49 If any lingering question about the place of summary judgment
42. Id. at 323 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)).
43. Id. at 325.
44. Id. (emphasis added).
45. Id. at 323-24.
46. Id. at 323.
47. Id. at 325. Justice White, who was the final vote in the narrow 5 to 4 majority, further explained in
his concurrence that the moving party cannot simply rely on a "conclusory assertion that the plaintiff
has no evidence to prove his case." Id. at 328 (White, J., concurring). Beyond this language,
however, the Court provided no further guidance regarding what in the existing record the defendant
must identify to show that the plaintiff cannot prevail.
48. Eight of the nine justices clearly agreed that, in spite of any language to the contrary in Adickes, the
defendant did not always have to provide affirmative evidence in order to meet its initial burden. As
to how the burden is met, Justice Brennan agreed with Justice White's contention that the defendant
must do more than argue - it must show how the record before the court does not support plaintiffs
case. Id. at 332 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Brennan diverged from the majority in how it applied the
standard it announced. Id at 334. He believed that the Court did not properly apply the standard to
the facts before it. Id.
49. Id. at 327. The Court discussed the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, noting that summary judgment
was a key to their success. "Rule 56 must be construed with due regard not only for the rights of the
persons asserting claims and defenses that are adequately based in fact to have to have those claims
and defenses tried to a jury, but also for the rights of persons opposing such claims and defenses to
demonstrate in the manner provided by the Rule, prior to trial, that the claims and defenses have no
factual basis." Id.
Southern Illinois University Law Journal
in pretrial litigation in the federal system remained, Celotex answered it
clearly: "Summary judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a
disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal
Rules as a whole ....
The second trilogy case, Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 51 settled the debate over how a court should draw inferences on a
motion for summary judgment. Specifically, the court decided whether a court
should deny summary judgment if there is the "slightest doubt" that the
plaintiff's case could be true or if the court should grant summary judgment
unless the plaintiff could support its claim with "substantial evidence. 52 The
Court chose the latter standard. While the facts of Matsushita were quite
complex, the case, which was an antitrust. dispute, turned on whether the
defendants had conspired. The district court found that based on the evidence
presented at the motion for summary judgment, plaintiffs could not create a
material issue of fact as to whether the parties conspired.53 The Third Circuit
disagreed and found that a fact finder could reasonably infer conspiracy from
plaintiffs' presentation of the facts.54
The Supreme Court reversed the Third Circuit, holding that there was no
evidence that defendants did anything other than engage in economically
sensible activities. The Court remanded for the appellate court to determine
whether plaintiffs could present evidence that "ten[ds] to exclude the
possibility that [defendants] underpriced [plaintiffs] to compete for business
rather than to implement an economically senseless conspiracy. '5  According
to the dissent56 by Justice White, the Court "overturn[ed] settled law" by
giving "every judge hearing a motion for summary judgment in an antitrust
case the job of determining if the evidence makes the inference of conspiracy
more probable than not."57
Finally, in Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,58 the Court clarified that the
summary judgment burden should be construed in light of the trial burden. In
Anderson, a public figure sued a reporter and his publication for libel.59 Under
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,6" plaintiffs were required to show actual
50. Id. at 327.
51. Matsushita, 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
52. Miller, supra note 4, at 1032.
53. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 579.
54. Id. at 580.
55. Id. at 597-98 (quotations omitted).
56. Justices Brennen, Blackmun, and Stevens joined.
57. Id. at 601.
58. Anderson, 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
59. Id. at 242.
60. New York Times, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
304 [Vol. 32
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malice with clear and convincing evidence. 6' The question in Anderson was
whether this standard of proof should inform the summary judgment
standard.62  The district court held that the clear and convincing evidence
standard applied and granted summary judgment in favor of defendants.63 The
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia disagreed and determined that
it was not appropriate to require such a showing at the summary judgment
stage.' The court concluded that requiring clear and convincing evidence
"would change the threshold summary judgment inquiry from a search for a
minimum of facts supporting the plaintiff's case to an evaluation of the weight
of those facts .... 6S
The Supreme Court disagreed and reversed the court of appeals, finding
that when "ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the judge must view the
evidence presented through the prism of the substantive evidentiary burden. 66
Justice White, writing for the majority, was careful to note that this
determination did not mandate a "trial on affidavits," asserting that
"[c]redibility determinations," "weighing of the evidence," and "the drawing
of legitimate inferences from the facts" were still the jury's domain.67
Nonetheless, the Court explicitly likened the summary judgment standard to
a directed verdict standard. Consequently, Justice Brennan and commentators
alike feared that the Court's conclusion in Anderson would "transform what
is meant to provide an expedited 'summary' procedure into a full-blown paper
,,18trial on the merits. Specifically, Justice Brennan argued in his dissent that,
given the evidentiary standard announced by the Court, plaintiffs and
defendants would come forward with "all of the evidence" supporting their
cases at the summary judgment stage and not simply rest on the evidence
necessary to resolve a narrow issue of fact.69
Together, these three cases sent a clear signal that the Court expects Rule
56 to play a prominent role in pretrial dispositions. In the next section, I will
address the critiques that were specifically levied at Celotex.
61. Id. at 279-80.
62. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 244.
63. Id. at 242.
64. Id.
65. Liberty Lobby v. Anderson, 746 F.2d 1563, 1570 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
66. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 254.
67. Id. at 255.
68. Id. at 266-67. Justice Brennan likened the court's conclusion in Anderson, which drew on a lengthy
interpretation of preceding cases, to a children's game of telephone.
69. Id at 267 (emphasis added). Justice Brennan also raised concerns regarding the constitutionality of
the summary judgment process if his prediction came true. Id.
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C. Initial Burden Standard Critique and Support
In the aftermath of Celotex, many commentators argued and continue to
argue that the scales were unfairly tipped in the defendant's favor. 70 Critics
examine how the case reallocates risk between the parties, criticize how
discovery is affected, and critique the lack of technical guidance provided by
the Court. Meanwhile, pro-summary judgment commentators reject these
criticisms. They assert that Celotex simply allows the summary judgment
process to work as the Advisory Committee originally intended.
The first major criticism of Celotex is that it increases the amount of
power a defendant yields at summary judgment. As one commentator notes,
"[s]omething close to a one page form motion by defendant [could] throw on
the plaintiff the responsibility to dredge, structure, collate and cross-reference
all materials in the file ... [well] before trial."'" In many cases, this effort
could require more work than simply trying the case, leading commentators
to wonder whether plaintiffs are unduly forced into settlement or, worse, into
not bringing the case at all.72
Relatedly, because Celotex made it easier to bring a summary judgment
motion, commentators suggest that all defendants will do so. As a result,
critics make broader arguments against the summary judgment process. They
argue that the consequence of a summary judgment motion will almost always
be negative for a plaintiff and positive for a defendant.73 If the plaintiff lost the
70. D. Michael Risinger, Another Step in the Counter-Revolution: A Summary Judgment on the Supreme
Court's New Approach to Summary Judgment, 54 BROOKLYN L. REv. 35, 37 (1988); see also
Issacharoff & Loewenstein, supra note 4, at 75 ("[S]ummary judgment fundamentally alters the
balance of power between plaintiffs and defendants by raising both the costs and risks to plaintiffs
in the pretrial phases of litigation while diminishing both for defendants.").
71. Id. at 4 ; see also lssacharoff & Loewenstein, supra note 4, at 93 (I ssacharoff and Loewenstein argue
that "the courts have sanctioned a cost-free motion for summary judgment in which the [defendant]
need not bear the cost of creating a record in order to put the issue of summary adjudication before
the court.").
72. Id.
73. Id. at 41-42. Risinger argues that the Supreme Court, through Celotex in particular:
[H]as introduced a procedure which is asymmetrical, grossly favoring defendants
over plaintiffs no matter which party is the movant. Under this approach, if the
plaintiff (the party with the burden of producing evidence at trial) makes a motion,
the plaintiff must tender the extraneous proofs that justify a prediction of the record
in order to obtain consideration .of the motion. But, if the defendant makes the
motion, the plaintiff still bears the burden of tendering the extraneous proofs that
justify a prediction of the record, or the plaintiff risks summary judgment against
him.
Id. at 39. See also Stempel, supra note 4, at 160 (arguing that the change made to Rule 56 by the
trilogy of cases made the summary judgment process "strikingly" more pro-defendant). Finally,
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motion, it would lose all or part of its entire case without having a chance to
present its full story and evidence.74 In addition, even if the plaintiff were to
prevail on the motion, the defendant would have a complete "blueprint" of
plaintiff's case-with every piece of evidence mapped out and accounted for.75
All this while there was no similar mechanism for the plaintiff to procure
defendant's blueprint.76
In addition to the risk allocation concerns, commentators worry about the
initial burden standard's effect on discovery. Critics argue that the plaintiff is
forced to produce its evidence, even if the defendant has not diligently pursued
discovery.77 The Celotex Court noted that the motion should only be decided
after "adequate time for discovery," but provided no further guidance beyond
that statement. 78  This has led many commentators to wonder whether the
defendant will make any effort to discover the plaintiffs case at all.79
Moreover, the critics suggest that the Court should have concentrated on the
quality of discovery and not on a "superficial measurement" such as the length
of the discovery period.8"
commentators argue that summary judgment violates the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial. See
Risinger, supra note 70, at 41; see also Thomas, supra note 4.
74. By comparing the summary judgment standard to that of a directed verdict, commentators note that
the Court missed a pragmatic difference between these two standards. In a directed verdict motion,
the plaintiff would have already presented its case, but in a motion for summary judgment, it would
not have done so. Nelken, supra note 24, at 65. Nelken notes, "[T]he majority failed to address the
practical differences created by the fact that summary judgment, unlike directed verdict, is sought
before the nonmoving party has attempted a full presentation of its case."; see also Risinger, supra
note 70, at 41-42 (arguing that if the parties and the bench are not thorough, "since the judge has no
other access to the potential record material, the result will be not merely a finding that the record
cannot confidently be predicted, but the entry of judgment for defendant."); Issacharoff &
Loewenstein, supra note 4, at 82 n. 49 (noting "significant differences" between summary judgment
and directed verdicts, including the lack of "asymmetry in expenditures" in the directed verdict
context because both parties "have incurred full pretrial trial expenses and a commensurate share of
trial expenses at the point when the motion for a directed verdict is made.,").
75. Risinger, supra note 70, at 42; see also Issacharoff & Loewenstein, supra note 4, at Ill ("The only
new information likely to emerge.., is a free peek at the plaintiff's trial tactics.").
76. Risinger, supra note 70, at 42; see also Issacharoff & Loewenstein, supra note 4, at I Il ("Summary
judgment under Celotex provides a unidirectional rule allowing defendants to force plaintiffs to reveal
trial strategies while not forcing reciprocal disclosure by defendants.")
77. Id.
78. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.
79. Risinger, supra note 70, at 42.
80. Nelken, supra note 24, at 66. Nelken argues that "[tihe focus should not be merely on the elapsed
time available for discovery but, more importantly, on the discovery efforts actually made by a
moving party before seeking summary judgment on the ground that the record is devoid of evidence
to establish an essential element of the nonmoving party's case." Id He notes that because discovery
is "as integral a part of the Federal Rules as summary judgment," defendants should "at a minimum
[have to] shoulder the expense of doing sufficient discovery to show that the plaintiff does not have
a case." Id. He adds, "[t]here is little merit in an interpretation of summary judgment procedure that
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Finally, a number of commentators criticize not only the holding of
Celotex, but the Court's lack of direction in the case. In announcing the
standard, the Court neglected to "delineate just how the standard would work
in practice and, in particular, how it would coordinate with the discovery
rules."'" Many commentators reject the suggestion that "argument" (or a
"conclusory allegation") is enough to carry the defendant's initial burden.
This conclusion is based on Justice White's statement in his concurrence that
"something more" is required.82 However, critics wonder whether defendants
exploit this ambiguity to further shift the power dynamic in their favor.
In rejecting these criticisms, supporters of the Celotex decision praise the
Court's practical solution. While admittedly critical of the lack of technical
guidance provided by the opinion, commentators support the result.
83
Specifically, supporters note, "the decision fostered the value of procedural
efficiency, reduced the danger of harassment of defendants, and reduced the
possibility of a jury's perversion of the substantive/procedural balance by
means of improper and unauthorized wealth distribution."' Commentators
argue that the Court removed "external" procedural barriers that unnecessarily
keep trial courts from reaching the merits of a case.85
More specifically, commentators reject the argument that defendants can
force plaintiffs to come forward with their case with just a one-page motion or
that the defendant can move well before a plaintiff completes its discovery.
These critics point to Rules 11 and 56(0: Rule 11 shields a plaintiff from
potential harassment and Rule 56(f) allows a plaintiff to complete its requisite
discovery.8 6 Arguably, these rules protect a plaintiff from any harassing or
would encourage parties not to use the discovery rules, in hopes of then invoking summary judgment
to force an opponent to reveal his case." Id.
81. Id. at 55; Martin H. Redish, Summary Judgment and the Vanishing Trial: Implications of the
Litigation Matrix, 57 STAN. L. REv. 1329, 1344 (2005) (noting the ambiguity of the Court's language
and the confusion it has caused).
82. Adam Price, Reconsidering Celotex: What is the Burden of Production when a Defendant Moves for
Summary Judgment on the Ground that Plaintiff Lacks Evidence?, 11 UTAH BAR J. 14 (1998)
(interpreting Celotex, based on Justice White's concurrence, as requiring the defendant to "explore
the evidentiary basis for the plaintiff's claims through deposition, interrogatory or request for
admission before moving for summary judgment on the ground that plaintiff lacks evidence" and to
"creat[e], through the discovery process, a record for the district court to review").
83. Redish, supra note 81, at 1347-48.
84. Id. at 1348.
85. Redish argues that under Adickes, a court could not properly reach the merits of the motion because
of the external initial production burden. He argues, however, that the internal burdens that are
applicable once the production burden is met should be reexamined.
86. Redish, supra note 81, at 1348. As noted in the introduction, Rule 11 provides for attorney sanctions.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. Rule 56(f) permits a continuance of the summary judgment motion to allow a
party to complete further discovery. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f).
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premature motions. As one commentator notes, the initial burden standard
only puts the motion squarely before the court; it does not dictate whether the
motion is granted or not.87
III. INITIAL BURDEN STANDARD RESEARCH-ARE THE CRITICS
RIGHT?
A. Research Sources & Methodology
To decipher whether the Celotex initial burden standard has the
descriptive consequences that commentators offer, I looked at how often
district and circuit courts address this procedural issue. I researched both
published and unpublished cases in Westlaw using a standard set of search
terms.88 Where a court substantively reviewed the initial burden standard, I
reviewed the case for content and disposition.
In addition to searching for cases on Westlaw, I reviewed a group of
cases in the District Court for the Northern District of California.90 The cases
87. Id.
88. For the district court cases, I searched in a database that grouped the district courts by circuit. For the
appellate court cases, I searched in a database organized by circuit. For both searches, I used the
following query: "'summary judgment' /s denied & 'did not' or fail/5 meet/5 'initial burden."' I call
this research my "Westlaw survey." My goal was to find cases where the district court denied a
summary judgment motion because the defendant did not meet its Celotex initial burden, not to find
just any case where the initial burden was discussed or mentioned. I chose this particular query after
running a number of different search combinations. The other searches resulted in a lower number
of cases; therefore, I chose the search query that provided the broadest results. See infra Appendix
A for a detailed chart of my results.
89. Of the over three hundred cases that resulted from my search query of district court cases, only 14 of
them, roughly 4%, substantively addressed the initial burden standard. In other words, only 14 of the
cases in my results discussed whether or not a party met its initial burden. While my search query
found cases in the First, Fourth, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits, none of the cases dealt
substantively with the initial burden. In addition, in the Sixth Circuit, my query did not find any cases
where the motion was denied because the defendant did not meet its initial burden. Therefore, of my
resulting cases, the initial burden was substantively addressed in only the Second, Third, Fifth,
Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits. Finally, my survey of appellate court cases yielded a similarly
small result - four cases out of the 20 cases in my results substantively analyzed the initial burden
standard.
90. Admittedly, there are some infirmities about conducting research in a single district court. However,
the Northern District of California is not unique in any way that would render it non-representative
of other districts. As of September 30, 2006, it had 7,279 pending civil cases. See U.S. District
Courts-Civil Cases Commenced, Terminated, and Pending During the 12-Month Period Ending
September 30, 2006, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2006/appendices/cl.pdf. This
places the Northern District of California close to the middle of the pack of pending civil cases, where
districts courts like the Southern District of New York had the highest at 16,852 cases and the District
of North Dakota had the lowest at 220 cases. Id. Also, the kinds of cases filed in the Northern
District of California are not heavily skewed towards one subject matter or another. See U.S. District
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span a three-year period from January 1, 2001-January 1, 2004. I narrowed
the cases by searching for published opinions where the court granted
summary judgment.91 There were 72 cases in all.92 I obtained copies of the
summary judgment motions, oppositions, and reply briefs in each case9 3 and
Courts--Civil Cases Pending, by Nature of Suit and District, During the 12-Month Period Ending
September 30, 2006, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2006/appendices/c3a.pdf. Because
of the representative nature of the Northern District of California, the cases reviewed provide a decent
picture of the state of cases nationwide. In addition, single district studies are not uncommon. See
Gerald F. Hess, Rule H Practice in Federal and State Court: An Empirical, Comparative Study, 75
MARQ. L. REV. 313, 334-35 (1992) (using a single-district study in the Eastern District of
Washington, the author looked at whether attorneys believed that Rule 11 negatively impacted
attorney-client relations); Susan M. Olson, Studying Federal District Courts Through Published
Decisions: A Research Note, 15 JUST. SYS. J. 782 (1992) (used a single-court study to compare
published and unpublished decisions to see whether published decisions were representative); Susan
Jensen-Conklin, Do Confirmed Chapter 11 Plans Consummate? The Results of a Study andAnalysis
of the Law, 97 COM. L.J. 297 (1992) (the author looked at cases filed in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court
for the Southern District of New York to see how many Chapter 11 cases were completely
consummated); Barry A. Gold & Elizabeth A. Donahue, Health Care Costs andPersonal Bankruptcy,
7 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 734, 736 (1982) (the authors used a single-district study to measure how
much health care costs contributed to bankruptcy filings); Hillel Y. Levin and John W. Emerson, Is
There a Bias Against Education in the Jury Selection Process?, 38 CONN. L. REV. 325 (2006) (using
the District Court for the District of Connecticut, the authors reviewed whether jury selection is biased
toward selecting less-educated jurors).
91. It goes without saying that published cases do not provide a full picture of how the initial burden
standard is used in federal district courts. However, in the interest of keeping the study manageable
and focused, I chose to use only those cases that the district court judges chose to publish. District
court judges use published opinions as a mechanism to inform the bench and bar about important
legal developments and decisions. Therefore, the use of published opinions, in this instance, is
appropriate. See also lssacharoff & Loewenstein, supra note 4, at 91 n.103 ("[O]ur decision to rely
on published opinions is justified by the critical role of published opinions in shaping the perception
among the bar of how the courts and handling procedural issues."). I ran the following search query
in the database for reported district court cases: CO (N.D.CAL.) & SY("Summary Judgment" &
Motion /s Granted) & DA(Aft 1/1/2003 & Bef 1/1/2006). I call this research my "district court
survey." See infra Appendix B for a detailed chart of my results.
92. The survey resulted in 85 cases, but the following 13 were not available or inapplicable: Google, Inc.
v. Microsoft Corp., 415 F.Supp.2d 1018 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (stay, not a summary judgment case);
Network Appliance v. Bluearc Corp., 374 F.Supp.2d 825 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (file sealed); Sharper
Image Corp. v. Neotec, Inc., 373 F.Supp.2d 993 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (file sealed); UMG Recordings v.
Hummer Winblad Venture Partners, 377 F.Supp.2d 796 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (MDL litigation); Visa
USA, Inc. v. First Data Corp., 369 F.Supp.2d 1121 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (motion for leave to file a
summary judgment motion); In re Deep Vein Thrombrosis, 356 F.Supp.2d 1055 (N.D. Cal. 2005)
(MDL litigation); Pixion, Inc. v. Placeware Inc., 421 F.Supp.2d 1233 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (file sealed);
Davis v. SSA, 281 F.Supp.2d 1154 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (motion for vacatur regarding motion for
summary judgment); Business Objects v. Microstrategy, 280 F.Supp.2d 1000 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (filed
sealed); NRDC v. Evans, 364 F.Supp.2d 1083 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (court file unavailable); Metro PCS
v. City & County of San Francisco, 259 F.Supp.2d 1004 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (court file unavailable);
Katherine G. v. Kentfield Sch. District, 261 F.Supp.2d 1159 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (file sealed);
Competitive Techs., Inc. v. Fujitsu Ltd., 333 F.Supp.2d 858 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (file sealed).
93. 1 obtained these documents using a combination of PACER, Westlaw Court Express, and the
Bloomberg Research System.
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reviewed the papers to see how the defendant carried its initial burden and
whether the plaintiff challenged the motion on initial burden grounds. I then
reviewed the opinions in each case to see whether the court substantively
discussed the initial burden standard.
I reviewed all of these cases in order to determine whether the
assessments made in response to the initial burden standard were accurate. My
overwhelming conclusion is that the specific descriptive critiques of the
standard miss the mark, and the statements in support, while closer to reality,
are incomplete. In this section, I review each of the critiques and statements
in support and explain how my research disproves, proves, or modifies these
theories.
B. One-Page Motions for Summary Judgment
A major criticism of the initial burden standard is that it permits
defendants to make one-page motions for summary judgment. Theoretically,
these motions baldly state that, based on the evidence in the record, the
plaintiff cannot prove its case. Based on this presumption, commentators
argue that defendants will not attempt to discover plaintiffs' evidence and will,
therefore, carry their initial burden without any effort. The reality of modem
litigation is quite different.
In all of the cases in my district court survey, the motions for summary
judgment exceeded a page. In fact, the motions averaged 23 pages in length.94
The defendants did more than make a summary statement of plaintiff's
inability to prove its case. To the contrary, as will be explained in a later
section, defendants detailed their legal arguments and relied on specific
evidence in the record. 95
Defendants submit more than one-page motions for a number of reasons.
First, because defendants want to win, they are likely to make all possible
arguments. They do not want to make the motion again and take on the
corresponding litigation costs or, even worse, risk proceeding to trial.96
Second, defense attorneys are motivated by a fee structure that relies on hours
spent on each task.97 Therefore, the incentive is quite great to research,
discover, and draft a significant motion. Finally, if a defendant believes that
94. See infra Appendix B.
95. See infra section 1H(e) and infra Appendix B.
96. See, e.g., Gideon Parchomovsky, Peter Siegelman, & Steve Thel, Of Equal Wrongs and HalfRights,
82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 738, n.78 (2007) (noting that "most cases do settle, both because of risk aversion
and in order to save litigation costs").
97. See, e.g., William G. Ross, The Ethics of Hourly Billing by Attorneys, 44 RUTGERS L. REV. 1 (1991)
(evaluating the pros and cons of hourly billing rates for civil defense attorneys).
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it has a winning argument, it will offer it. It will not rely on a simple statement
regarding plaintiff's alleged lack of a case. If there is a winning motion to be
made, the defendant and its attorneys have every incentive to make it.
C. Blueprint of the Plaintiff's Case
. Another central criticism of the standard is called into question by the
complexity of modem motion practice. After Celotex was decided, many
commentators argued that "based on a one-page motion," the plaintiff can be
forced to come forward with all of its evidence and prematurely show the
nature of its case.98 Without much effort by the defendant, plaintiff has to
reveal a "blueprint" of its entire case.99 This criticism is not supported by the
cases I studied.
In the district court survey, 38 of the 72 cases were decided on cross
motions.l" In those cases, the plaintiff moved without a requirement to come
forward with evidence "in response" to the defendant's motion. The plaintiff
revealed at least some portion of its case against defendant, not because of
defendant's deft use of the initial burden standard, but because it chose to
move on its own."°
The results in my Westlaw survey show a similar pattern.10 2 In five of the
fourteen district court cases, the plaintiff brought a cross motion." Again,
these plaintiffs came forward with affirmative evidence of their own without
any procedural requirement to do so."' In addition, in eight of the cases,
where one. part of the defendant's motion was denied on initial burden
grounds, the defendant prevailed on summary judgment as to one or more of
98. See supra section 1(c).
99. Id.
100. See infra Appendix B.
101. Choice in this case may be too strong a term. The plaintiffs may have filed a cross motion solely
because defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. Without talking to the parties themselves,
it is not possible to know what primarily motivated their motions.
102. In this part of my research, I only looked at cases that substantively addressed the initial burden
standard. These results are not based on a full survey of all summary judgment motions every
brought. However, the cases are interesting because they show that even when a court denies a
motion because the defendant has not met its initial burden, there is often more to the story.
103. See infra Appendix A: Wilson v. Sullivan, 709 F.Supp. 1351, 1354 (D.N.J. 1989); Propath Servs. v.
Quest Diagnostics Clinical Laboratories, Inc., No. Civ. 3:00-CV-2391-H, 2002 WL 535056, at *1
(N.D. Tex. Apr. 9, 2002); Century Products Co. v. Cosco, Inc., No. 3:00-CV-0800-BC, 2001 WL
1577607, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 6,2001); Technip Offshore Contractors v. Williams Field Servs., No.
Civ.A.H 04 0096, 2006 WL 581273, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 7, 2006); Boucher v. Sears, No. 89-CV-
1353, 1995 WL 283742, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. May 8, 1995).
104. As stated earlier, the plaintiffs may have only brought the motion in response to defendant's summary
judgment motion. The motivation for filing a cross motion is difficult to quantify.
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its other claims." 5 Thus, even when the defendant did not meet its initial
burden as to one part of its motion, it met it as to other parts of plaintiff's case.
As to those claims, the plaintiff either came forward with its own evidence or
conceded the claim. The result is that, to some degree, the plaintiff tipped its
hand before trial either by moving affirmatively with its own motion or
presenting evidence in response to all or part of the defendant's motion.
This research calls into question the idea that the initial burden standard
would cause a plaintiff to prematurely reveal its case. 6 The critique fails to
account for the complexity of federal litigation where motions are brought on
multiple grounds and issues are often presented on cross motions for summary
judgment. °7 It may be that, like defendants, plaintiffs will move if they think
they can prevail-regardless of what that motion may reveal about their broader
case. In addition, similar attorneys fees considerations apply. Many plaintiffs'
attorneys provide services on a contingency basis so the billing considerations
are not the same.' But, where a plaintiff prevails on some part of its motion
for summary judgment, settlement (and the corresponding attorneys fees
without the time and expense of trial) is more likely. Therefore, many of the
same incentives that drive defendants to file full motions for summary
judgment drive plaintiffs to come forward with their evidence prior to trial.
105. See infra Appendix A: Harbour Cove Marine Servs., Inc. v. Rabinowitz, Civ. 02-1695(RBK), 2005
WL 1038957, at *5 (D.N.J. May 3, 2005) (granting summary judgment in favor of defendant on the
Consumer Fraud Act Claim because plaintiff conceded the claim in its opposition); Wilson, 709
F.Supp. at 1360 (granting summary judgment for defendant as to plaintiff's Administrative Procedure
Act claim); Ramirez v. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Cir., No. Civ.A. 3:03-CV-2625D, 2005 WL 1017820,
at *4 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 28, 2005) (defendant prevailed on summary judgment as to plaintiff's
discrimination claim because plaintiff could not show a prima facie case); In re Voluntary Purchasing
Groups, Inc. Litig., No. Civ. 3:94-CV-2477-H, 2003 WL 21499270, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Jun. 26, 2003)
(court denied motion for reconsideration as to its finding that defendant prevailed on summary
judgment for the CERCLA §107 claim against it); Anderson v. Comejo, 225 F.Supp.2d 834, 869
(N.D. Il1. 2002) (multiple claims against defendants dismissed on summary judgment because plaintiff
could not show a material issue of fact); Gupta v. City of Norwalk, 221 F.Supp.2d 282, 295 (D.Conn.
2002) (court granted defendant's motion as to the claim against it for intentional infliction of
emotional distress); Boucher, 1995 WL 283742 at *8 (plaintiffs failed to show a knowing agreement
to commit conspiracy, thus, defendant's summary judgment motion as to the RICO claims against it
was granted); Chongyee Lengnou Xiong v. Veneman, No. I:02-CV-6525-SMS, 2005 WL 3557176,
at * 15 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2005) (court granted defendant's motion as to plaintiff's discriminatory
treatment claims against it because plaintiff could not show the necessary animus).
106. Seesupra notes 103, 105.
107. See infra Appendix B.
108. See, e.g., Stewart Jay, The Dilemmas of Attorney Contingent Fees, 2 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHtCS 813
(1989) (discussing the pros and cons of plaintiff attorneys use of contingency fees).
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D. Discovery
A related standard critique of the Celotex decision is that defendants will
no longer engage in discovery because they can get a summary judgment
motion before the court by arguing that plaintiffs have no evidence. Therefore,
they do not need to present any evidence of their own to support their motion.
According to my research, this is simply not the case. In my district court
survey, defendants routinely referred to evidence obtained through more
extensive discovery.'0 9 As provided in Celotex, this evidence consisted of
deposition testimony and interrogatories propounded by defendants." '
However, defendants also often presented affidavits or deposition testimony
from their experts, declarations or deposition testimony from their witnesses,
and evidentiary information otherwise obtained from plaintiffs. 1 ' In other
words, defendants did not simply rely on the bare record. To the contrary,
many of the defendants engaged in full discovery and used the information
obtained to make their motion. 12 Finally, in further support of the conclusion
109. See infra Appendix B: Business Objects v. Microstrategy, 381 F.Supp.2d 1107 N.D. Cal. 2005)
(defendant relied on its expert affidavits); Medtronic, Inc. v. White, 365 F.Supp.2d 1105 (N.D. Cal.
2005) (defendant relied on its own affidavits and deposition testimony); Villegas v. City of Gilroy,
363 F.Supp.2d 1207 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (same); Environmental Protection Information Ctr. v.
Blackwell, 389 F.Supp.2d 1174 (N.D.Cal 2004) (defendant relied on number of its own studies and
environmental reports); Helus v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the S., 309 F.Supp.2d 1170 (N.D.
Cal. 2004) (defendant used its own expert testimony as the basis for its motion); Bryan v. UPS, 307
F.Supp.2d 1108 (N.D.Cal 2004) (in addition to extensive deposition testimony, defendant moved on
the the bases of its own witness declarations and affidavits); Glenn v. Berndt, 289 F.Supp.2d 1120
(N.D. Cal. 2003) (same); Mooring v. San Francisco Sheriff's Dept., 289 F.Supp.2d 1110 (N.D. Cal.
2003) (same); Harvey v. Alameda County, 280 F.Supp.2d 960 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (defendant cited to
own expert declarations); Reiffm v. Microsoft Corp., 270 F.Supp.2d 1132 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (same).
110. Id. See infra Appendix B: IXYS Corp. v. Advanced Power, 321 F.Supp.2d 1133 (N.D. Cal. 2004)
(defendant relied on deposition testimony and declarations in the record); O'Donovan-Conlin v.
United States Dept. of State, 255 F.Supp.2d 1075 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (defendant moved based on
exhibits attached to plaintiffs' original complaint); Schar v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., 242 F.Supp.2d 708
(N.D. Cal. 2003) (defendant relied on deposition testimony of third party doctor).
111. See supra note 109.
112. However, there were also a number of cases where evidence was not at issue. Many cases turned on
the review of an administrative record or pure issues of law. In those cases, the parties engaged in
little or no discovery because it was not required to resolve the legal issue before the court. See infra
Appendix B: Lawless v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 360 F.Supp.2d 1046 (N.D. Cal. 2005)
(ERISA case); Horn v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 351 F.Supp. 2d 954 (N.D. Cal. 2004)
(ERISA case regarding applicable standard of review); Miller v. United States, 345 F.Supp.2d 1046
(N.D. Cal. 2004) (interpretation of the tax code); Games v. Barnhardt, 352 F.Supp.2d 1059 (N.D.
Cal. 2004) (social security administration review case); Kenny v. United States, 329 F.Supp.2d 1193
(N.D. Cal. 2004) (tax case where parties stipulated to the facts); Firestone v. Acuson Corp. Long Term
Disability Plan, 326 F.Supp.2d 1040 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (review of administrative record in ERISA
case); Miller v. San Mateo-Foster City Unified Sch. Dist., 318 F.Supp.2d 851 (N.D. Cal. 2004)
(review of administrative record in IDEA case); Cherene v. First Am. Fin. Corp. Long Term
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that defendants in fact engage in the discovery process, the average time
between the filing of the complaint and the filing of the summary judgment
motion was 17 months." 3  If defendants were content to move without
conducting much discovery, they would likely move well before 17 months
passed.
E. Technical Standard Unclear
A final major critique of the initial burden standard is that the Court
failed to clearly articulate the standard's technical requirements." 4
Commentators wonder whether defendants exploit the imprecision, whether
courts misapply the standard, and whether the parties engage in needless
litigation over the standard. As to the latter concern, according to my research,
the initial burden standard is not extensively litigated. In my Westlaw survey,
neither the district nor appellate courts wrestled with the initial burden
standard very often." 5 The same was true in my district court survey." 6
Disability Plan, 303 F.Supp.2d 1030 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (review of administrative record in ERISA
case); NRDC v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., 280 F.Supp.2d 1007 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (review of
administrative record in environmental case). In addition, in some cases, the dispute was over an
issue on which the defendant bore the burden of persuasion. See infra Appendix B: Gordon v. FBI,
388 F.Supp.2d 1028 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (FOIA request so defendant agency bears burden of
persuasion); Modesto Irrigation Dist. v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 309 F.Supp.2d 1156 (N.D. Cal. 2004)
(defendant moved on the basis of its affirmative defense). Finally, in some cases, the plaintiff moved
for summary judgment so it bore the burden of persuasion on the motion. See infra Appendix B:
United States v. Chung-Shiaing Wang, 404 F.Supp.2d 1159 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (plaintiff's motion);
Nichols v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 287 F.Supp.2d 1088 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (same); Brucia v.
Hartford Accident & Indem., 207 F.Supp.2d 1079 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (same).
113. See infra Appendix B.
114. See supra Section 1(c).
115. See infra Appendix A. In a targeted search of all published and unpublished cases found in Westlaw,
only 18 district and appellate court cases dealt substantively with whether the initial burden standard
was met or not. My search may have missed some marginal number of cases. However, even
assuming that I only found five percent of the cases that address this issue (18 of 360 cases), the initial
burden standard is still a relatively minor issue. In the untold number of summary judgment motions
that are made, the parties do not often debate whether the initial burden standard has been met.
116. See infra Appendix B. The court did not discuss a dispute regarding the initial burden standard in any
of the cases in this survey. In only two cases, the plaintiff argued that defendant did not meet its
burden. In Cole v. Doe, 387 F.Supp.2d 1084 (N.D. Cal. 2005), as to its Monell claim, plaintiff started
to argue that defendant did not meet its initial burden. However, it failed to follow up on the
argument, and the defendant and court ignored it. In Digital Envoy, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 370
F.Supp.2d 1025 (N.D. Cal. 2005), the defendant and the court did not address plaintiff's argument
that defendant did not meet its initial burden. This is probably because the court based its decision
on a theory that did not require reaching the initial burden issue. See also Issacharoff& Loewenstein,
supra note 4, at 92-93. In a survey of district court cases, Issacharoff and Loewenstein found that in
60% of the cases where the court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment, it did so without
any discussion of whether the defendant met its initial burden of production. Of course, the lack of
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As to the remaining two related concerns, my research reveals that the
parties most often meet the standard in the strictest sense and that courts most
often correctly enforce the standard. First, defendants certainly have the right
to move on a "lack of evidence" theory under Celotex. They can possibly even
rest on a "conclusory allegation."' " However, according to my research, most
defendants do not move for summary judgment in this fashion. They move
based on evidence that affirmatively negates plaintiffs' case." 8 For example,
in Chance WOrld Trading, the court stated that "even though not required for
Heritage Bank to succeed on its motion for summary judgment, Heritage Bank
has produced evidence that it did not know of Ms. Yadav-Ranjan's fraud." "19
In that case, defendant presented multiple declarations from its employees
along with excerpts of plaintiffs' depositions to affirmatively negate plaintiffs'
legal assertions.
Moreover, on the rare occasion when defendants rely on some version of
a "conclusory allegation" to carry their initial burden, and the courts allow it,
it is not controversial. For example, in my district court survey, defendants
relied on such a statement in only 7 of the 72 cases. 12  In two of those cases,
plaintiffs made a cross motion on the same issue.' 2 1 Cross motions should
technically be taken separately; however, because of the plaintiffs' cross
motions, the court knew whether the plaintiffs had enough evidence to support
their case and could disregard the defendants' failure to meet their initial
burden. In addition, by presenting cross motions, the parties are implicitly
conceding that there are no material issues of fact and only legal disputes at
discussion does not mean that the standard is being applied properly. However, as discussed later in
the article, from my study, it appears that the standard is correctly applied more often than not.
117. In spite of the language in Justice White's concurrence, researchers have found that some courts allow
"argument" or a "conclusory allegation" to suffice. See Comett, supra note 7, at 187. Cornett stated
that "the United States Supreme Court and the lower federal courts [have] consistently read Celotex
as authorizing... a conclusory assertion by the movant that the nonmovant had no evidence to prove
her case." (citing, among other cases, Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 885 (1990)
("Celotex made clear that Rule 56 does not require the moving party to negate the elements of the
nonmoving party's case ...."); Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1478 (6th Cir. 1989)
(finding that after Celotex, "the movant could challenge the opposing party to 'put up or shut up' on
a critical issue" and that "a party may move for summary judgment asserting that the opposing party
will not be able to produce sufficient evidence at trial to withstand a directed verdict motion")).
118. See infra Appendix B and supra notes 109-11.
119. Chance World Trading E.C. v. Heritage Bank of Commerce, 438 F.Supp.2d 1081, 1086 (N.D. Cal.
2005). See infrd Appendix B.
120. See infra Appendix B: Wham-O, Inc. v. Sport Dimension, Inc., 398 F.Supp.2d 1081 (N.D. Cal.
2005); Hupp v. City of Walnut Creek, 389 F.Supp.2d 1229 (N.D. Cal. 2005); Cole v. Doe, 387
F.Supp.2d 1084 (N.D. Cal. 2005); Merrifield v. Lockyer, 388 F.Supp.2d 1051 (N.D. Cal. 2005);
Digital Envoy, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 370 F.Supp.2d 1025 (N.D. Cal. 2005); Martinez v. Marin Sanitary
Services, 349 F.Supp.2d 1234 (N.D. Cal. 2004); O'Donovan-Conlin, 255 F.Supp.2d 1075.
121. See infra Appendix B: Hupp, 389 F.Supp.2d 1229; Merrifield, 388 F.Supp.2d 1051.
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issue. Therefore, the court has an interest in reaching those legal
disagreements.
As to four of the remaining five "conclusory allegation" cases, the parties
and the court had good reason to gloss over any initial burden issue. For
instance, in Wham-O, Inc., the plaintiff conceded the claim in its opposition
to defendant's motion, and in Digital Envoy, the court based its decision on a
separate claim that did not require it to reach the initial burden question at
all. '2 Therefore, in the one remaining case out of 72, the court arguably made
an error by failing to deny the motion when the defendant did not meet its
initial burden.1
23
Similarly, in my Westlaw survey, courts erred as to their application of
the initial burden standard in only three cases. The most egregious example
is in Chongyee v. Veneman. 124 There, the court held that the defendant failed
to produce affirmative evidence to negate plaintiff's disparate impact claim;
25
but, under Celotex, defendant's argument that plaintiff's statistical evidence
was lacking should have sufficed. The other two cases where the initial
burden standard was arguably misconstrued are much less compelling because
the misapplication did not alter the ultimate result. In these appellate court
cases, the courts reversed the district courts based on a finding that defendants
did not meet their initial burden. 26  However, in reality, the appellate courts
simply differed with the district court on the basis of a factual or legal finding
-not as to the initial burden standard.
27
While my research revealed a few unfortunate errors or missteps, the
results are hardly epidemic. The errors are of the type and quantity that one
122. See infra Appendix B. In Martinez, the defendant argued that plaintiff could not show that he was
not promoted within the applicable statute of limitations. This issue turned solely on a question of
timing, which did not require any evidentiary finding other than the timing of plaintiffs filing of his
complaint. Finally, in O'Donovan-Conlin, the parties disputed whether one of the plaintiffs was a
citizen of the United States. The question turned on evidence such as plaintiff's birth certificate and
adoption records, which were filed as exhibits to his complaint and already in the record.
123. See supra note 120 and infra Appendix B (Cole, 387 F.Supp.2d at 1084).
124. See infra Appendix A.
125. Chongyee, 2005 WL 3557176 at *14.
126. See infra Appendix A: Norman v. Apache Corp., 19 F.3d 1017 (5th Cir. 1994); Cambee's Furniture,
Inc. v. Doughboy Recreational, Inc., 825 F.2d 167, 174 (8th Cir. 1987).
127. In Norman, the appellate court determined that the case turned on whether the contract had been
amended by the parties' actions or whether the plaintiff had relied on the defendant's actions to its
detriment. This was an issue of law, or in the very least, a dispute over the salient facts. It was not
a procedural issue. In Cambee's Furniture, Inc., the appellate court found that the defendant had not
carried its initial burden regarding the issue of recoupment. However, the district court did not look
at recoupment. The circuit court differed with the district court as a matter of law, but, as in Norman,
rather than saying so explicitly, the circuit court located its differing legal analysis in an initial burden
standard discussion.
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would expect in any survey of cases. Courts and parties will always be
fallible; one cannot say, however, that ambiguity in the initial burden standard
is causing gross error or exploitation by the courts and parties.
F. Support for the Initial Burden Standard: Rule 56(f) and Rule 11
Motions
It is difficult to quantify in any meaningful way whether summary
judgment is more efficient because of the initial burden standard. Efficiency
is a nebulous concept, and one's perception of whether or not the system is
working better depends largely on how one qualitatively views summary
judgment. If one views summary judgment as a good process (and any
corresponding "frivolous trials" as bad), then an increase in summary
judgment dispositions is a good thing. In contrast, if one views an increase in
summary judgment as a further assault on litigants' right to trial, an increase
in summary judgment dispositions and the corresponding decrease in trials is
a negative result. Therefore, it is impossible to objectively judge whether
commentators who support the initial burden standard are right in arguing that
it makes summary judgment more efficient.
The one supportive response that can be judged, however, is whether
plaintiffs use the failsafe procedures that proponents of the initial burden
standard offer. Specifically, do plaintiffs rely on Rules 11 and 56(f) to protect
themselves from frivolous or harassing summary judgment motions?
According to my research, plaintiffs do not use Rule 11 motions at all and use
Rule 56(f) motions sparingly and only with a moderate level of success. In
only four of the 72 cases did the plaintiff move for a Rule 56(f) extension in
response to the defendant's motion.' 28  The court granted plaintiff's 56(f)
request in one of those cases. 12
9
There are a number of explanations for this result. It could be argued that
Rules 11 and 56(f) are not providing plaintiffs with enough protection from
harassing and premature summary judgment motions; or, considering the
preceding research, it may be that plaintiffs do not need these mechanisms
because defendants either meet their burden or the initial burden standard is
not otherwise at issue. Alternatively, the mere presence of the rules may be
enough to encourage the parties to act responsibly. In other words, while the
128. See infra Appendix B: Enreach Tech., Inc. v. Embedded Internet Solutions, 403 F.Supp.2d 968 (N.D.
Cal. 2005); 321 Studios v. MGM Studios, 307 F.Supp.2d 1085 (N.D. Cal. 2004); Reiffin, 270
F.Supp.2d 1132; Bauer v. Interpublic Group of Cos., 255 F.Supp.2d 1086 (N.D. Cal. 2003).
129. In Enreach Tech., Inc., the court granted plaintiffs Rule 56(f) motion as to one of plaintiffs claims.
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parties may not use these rules very often, critics may have been right to argue
that the rules' very existence cabin defendants' actions.
G. The Results
Looking at the overall survey results, the overwhelming conclusion is
that the Celotex critics have not correctly anticipated how defendants would
react to the initial burden standard. Relatedly, while not addressing whether
the institutional effects of summary judgment are good or bad, the surveys
show that the supporters' descriptive responses to the Celotex initial burden
standard are somewhat vindicated. More importantly, however, the results
raise the following critical question: Why were so many commentators wrong
about how defendants would respond to Celotex's initial burden standard?
IV. RESEARCH ASSESSMENT AND A PROPOSAL
A. Why the Critics Were Wrong
Procedure is meant to effectuate substantive law. 130 And while most
scholars accept that the line between procedure and substance is superbly
fuzzy,1 31 there is still a tendency to think about procedure atomistically, as if
it were reducible to a mathematical equation: if x + y = z, then plaintiff will
do z, and if a + b = c, then defendant will do c. The prevalence of this
perception of procedure-one without an appreciation for the forest, only the
trees-is what led many commentators to overestimate the consequences of
Celotex. As my research shows, the specific descriptive criticisms of Celotex
are not materializing largely because the commentators did not account for all
of the factors affecting litigation or human behavior.
First, when looking at one procedural change, other parts of the
procedural system must also be weighed. To view the summary judgment
process, for instance, without thinking about how the discovery rules impact
130. Wright & Reasoner, supra note 9, at 69. Judge Clark writes that civil procedure should be "du[ly]
subordinat[e] ... to the ends of substantive justice." In this same article, Judge Clark famously
compares the rules of civil procedure to a handmaid, noting that a handmaid will become a mistress
if the opportunity presents itself. Id. Judge Clark warns of a similar temptation with procedural rules
and implores judges to "continually restrict[] [procedural rules] to their proper and subordinate role,"
lest they "assume a too obtrusive a place in the attentions ofjudges and lawyers." Id.
131. See Robert G. Bone, "ho Decides? A Critical Look at Procedural Discretion, 28 CARDozo L. REV.
1961, 1973 (2007) (noting that starting in the 1970s, academics began to accept the notion that "[n]ot
only did procedural rules have substantive effects; they could-and many thought they should-be
designed to promote substantive values").
2008]
Southern Illinois University Law Journal
the parties' decisions is a mistake. When Celotex was announced, robust
discovery rules were in play.132  Even then, zealous discovery was so
entrenched in the litigation system that it made no sense for a defendant to
engage in initial disclosures, document requests, interrogatories, and
depositions, only to file only one-page motion. When the initial burden
standard is viewed in isolation, it may seem rational for a defendant to forego
discovery, make a one-page motion, and simply wait to win at summary
judgment. When one considers the other procedural rules at play, however,
it seems unlikely for a defendant to act this way.
In addition, many extraneous factors-fee structures, clientlattorney
relationships, relationships between the parties, court administration concerns,
judicial ethos-impact the practice of law. For example, when Celotex was
announced, courts were already motivated to expedite their dockets,'33 and
parties were prone to make their best arguments at any and all litigation stages.
By not considering these human factors, critics fail to appreciate how small
changes to the procedural framework actually affect litigation. As much of the
scholarship criticizing law and economic analysis of "rational actors" has
shown, accounting for some modicum of actual human behavior is crucial to
developing precise law and legal theories. 34
The failure to account for the "forest" led many commentators to draw
imprecise conclusions about what kind of effect a change in the initial burden
standard would have. Yet, I am not arguing that the system cannot be and has
not been changed by rule amendments or changes in Supreme Court precedent.
Major structural changes to the procedural system would, of course, have an
immediate impact on how litigation is conducted. For instance, if the
requirements of notice pleading were changed, defendants would, in the short
term at least, have some advantage.'35 However, one-off changes like a shift
132. See Richard L. Marcus, Discovery Containment Redux, 39 B.C. L. REv. 747 (1998). Marcus provides
a historical overview of the development of the discovery rules. Notably, he points out that as early
as 1970, discovery was a major part of litigation. Id. at 749 (citing a study by the Project for Effective
Justice of Columbia Law School).
133. See Marc S. Galanter, The Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L. REV. 3, 15 (1986) (finding
that federal civil court filings for the decade from 1975-1984 increased by 123%).
134. See, e.g., Robert A. Prentice, The Case of the Irrational Auditor: A Behavioral Insight into Securities
Fraud Litigation, 95 Nw. U.L. REv. 133, 133-34 (2000) (summarizing the debate regarding the value
of behavioral analysis in legal scholarship).
135. Interestingly, the Supreme Court recently announced an opinion that arguably makes just this change.
See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007) (calling into question the application of
the "no set of facts" pleading standard set forth in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957)).
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in the initial burden standard under Celotex, as it happens, did not create great
institutional change.'36
The broader problem with the erroneous response to Celotex is what it
reveals about how some commentators view procedural rulemaking. Because
academic discourse affects the development of procedural rules by influencing
courts and rulemaking bodies, it is crucial for the academy to critically think
about its analysis. As noted above, procedure is affected by other factors in
the litigation system and the realities of human behavior. And while
conceiving of the rules as linear is important to further goals such as fairness
and predictability, the rules must also be nimble enough to respond to reality.
In short, the rules and the rulemaking process must balance theoretical goals
with a sense of how rules work in practice. The balance, as I argue in the next
section, should be struck by providing parties with as much clarity and
stability as possible with respect to procedural requirements, while at the same
time responding to what is actually happening in litigation. This means that
when members of the academy critique the rules, they must, at the very least,
appreciate and account for how the litigation system really functions.
Inclusion of this analysis is crucial if we want to effectively critique, draft, and
amend the rules.'37
B. What is the Initial Burden Standard All About & What Should it Do?
The question remains whether anything should be done to Rule 56 to
reflect the Celotex initial burden standard. Some commentators suggest that
the initial burden standard is simply a requirement without substance and that,
accordingly, the federal rules should eliminate the hurdle and provide for a "no
136. I am not denying that Celotex, Matsushita, and Liberty Lobby invigorated summary judgment. But,
the change to the initial burden standard did not cause this change on its own. A combination of
factors, including Celotex, contributed to the larger changes that summary judgment brought to the
legal system. In fact, many of the structural forces encouraging increased use of summary judgment
were already in place. See e.g., William W Schwarzer, Summary Judgment Under the Federal Rules:
Defining Genuine Issues of Material Fact, 99 F.R.D. 465 (1983-84) (asserting that the perception that
summary judgment was not often used and/or resulted in high reversal rates was a misperception and
arguing that summary judgment was a valuable tool of procedure and not a "procedural shortcut").
The crux of my argument is that it is a mistake to extrapolate a parade of horribles from one
procedural change like the initial burden standard.
137. The recent amendments to the e-discovery rules in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide an
example of this kind of reality-based discourse. The Advisory Committee considered significant
input from practitioners and technology experts before drafting these amendments. See generally,
REPORT OF THE CIVIL RULES ADVISORY COMMITEE (May 27, 2005) at 18, available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Reports/CV5-2005.pdf (summarizing the "extensive and intensive
study of [electronic] discovery").
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evidence" rule.1 38  However, there are many substantial critiques of this
approach. Some critics argue that such a rule would be "extremely wasteful."
A defendant could be fully aware of plaintiffs case, and yet, move for
summary judgment just to harass the plaintiff.'39 Also, some commentators
question how the rule would work when the plaintiff could only satisfy its
burden of proof through circumstantial evidence-"a painstaking, item-by-item,
process."' 40 If so easily forced into a summary judgment motion, these kinds
of plaintiffs may simply stop bringing their cases, meritorious or otherwise.
Another possibility is to give the initial burden requirement some teeth.
As at least one commentator suggests, a defendant could still request that the
plaintiff come forward with evidence on a specific factual issue.' 41 However,
the court would not grant the order unless "the cost of compliance would not
be burdensome or at least far less than the cost of proof at trial."'42
Consequently, in addition to adding a cost-benefit analysis to the motion itself,
if the plaintiff won, defendant would have to pay plaintiff's costs and fees.
Finally, many commentators suggest that the initial burden standard is
working fine as it is. Because the status quo is not broken, these commentators
argue that the rule should not substantively change. I tend to agree with this
latter argument-although for different reasons.
As discussed above, when evaluating procedure, it is crucial to account
for the impact of other procedural rules and the realities of human behavior.
Drawing from my research, existing procedural rules may have prevented
defendants from reacting drastically to the Celotex initial burden standard. It
may be that the mere threat of a Rule 1 1 sanction or the possibility of extended
discovery under Rule 56(f) was sufficient to cabin defendants' actions. Add
to that the broad discovery tools provided in the rules, and it seems even less
likely that defendants would change much about how they technically make
their summary judgment motions. In addition, other aspects of litigation-such
as the incentives provided by how attorneys bill and the reality of how a judge
will view cross motions for summary judgment--contribute to maintaining the
status quo in how parties behave following a rule change like the Celotex
138. The state of Texas has a no-evidence summary judgment rule. Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(i) ("After
adequate time for discovery, a party without presenting summary judgment evidence may move for
summary judgment on the ground that there is no evidence of one or more essential elements of a
claim or defense on which an adverse party would have the burden of proof at trial. The motion must
state the elements as to which there is no evidence. The court must grant the motion unless the
respondent produces summary judgment evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact.")
139. Jack H. Friedenthal, Cases on Summary Judgment: Has There Been a Material Change in
Standards?, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 770, 776 (1988).
140. Id. at 777.
141. Id. at 779.
142. Id. at 780.
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initial burden standard. All this is to say that while Celotex and the trilogy had
an undeniable impact on summary judgment's primacy in the American legal
system, the change to the technical initial burden standard did not alter much
about the intricacies of day-to-day litigation practice.
That leaves rulemakers with a tough call as to whether Rule 56 should be
amended to account for the initial burden standard or not. As noted above,
courts and parties are generally getting the initial burden standard right.'43
However, the ambiguity in the Court's articulation of the initial burden
standard leaves room for it to be used incorrectly. In some cases, courts or
parties may advance it as a procedural crutch to avoid substantive issues.'"
In addition, the ambiguity can lead to confusion regarding when and how the
standard applies. 4 ' On the margins, lawyers, parties, and courts will wittingly
or unwittingly use the ambiguity to their advantage. Accounting for human
behavior, it should come as no surprise that some will exploit unclear
standards or language to achieve another goal. Consequently, for a
requirement like the initial burden standard to be most useful, it should be
absolutely clear.
Therefore, the rule should be amended to remove any ambiguity by
laying out the steps for summary judgment in clear and complete terms.
Specifically, Rule 56 should explicitly articulate the initial burden standard:
when a defendant moves for summary judgment on an issue for which it does
not bear the burden of persuasion, it must provide the court with specific
reference to the evidence that demonstrates plaintiffs inability to prove its
claim. The defendant may carry its burden by presenting affidavits and
evidence of its own or by providing the court with a copy of the evidence from
the record. 14 6 In other words, the defendant must be perfectly clear about what
part of the existing court record or the parties' discovery shows that plaintiff s
claim will fail. As already discussed, this is largely what is happening in real
cases. Clarity in the rule will simply assure that all parties have accurate
information and expectations.
143. By right, I mean requiring more than a mere "conclusory allegation" from the defendant.
144. See supra section M1(e).
145. See infra Appendix B. In twelve of the cases in my district court survey, the court stated the initial
burden standard even when it did not apply to the case before it. Similarly, in at least four of the
cases, the parties advanced the wrong standard. While not fatal to the parties or the rigor of the legal
analysis, it is confusing and inefficient. The use of form language in opinions can be confusing for
the parties and create inconsistent precedent.
146. I am certainly not the first to suggest this change. Academics such as Martin Reddish have suggested
a similar amendment. See Redish, supra note 81, at 1357. My contribution is to locate this analysis
in the context of a new methodology-reliance on an evaluation of the motions, oppositions, and
opinions from actual cases. By looking at how the initial burden standard works at the ground level,
there is more practical support for this kind of change.
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According to Judge Clark, the federal rules should not be static.'47 He
understood that the contours of legal practice would change with time. And,
with that in mind, he said that the rules should be constantly reevaluated. The
Advisory Committees, informed by the bench and bar, are charged with
making sure the rules are relevant. More eloquently, Judge Clark stated he
believed the Committees should "constantly... revivify and restore [the rules]
to their original purposes."'48 Therefore, with the goal of "revivification" in
mind, this amendment would respond to both the realities of practice and the
theoretical goals of fairness and predictability.
V. CONCLUSION
The response to Celotex provided and continues to provide fertile ground
for debate and discussion regarding summary judgment. With respect to the
specific change to the initial burden standard, it is fascinating to note that
much of the criticism surrounding this change has simply not come to pass.
More importantly, the misperception of how the change to the initial burden
standard would play out in practice provides a unique opportunity to re-
evaluate how we think about the rules. With respect to both Rule 56 and other
changes to procedural rules, I argue that we can learn from these
misperceptions. Specific to Rule 56, the rule can be amended to provide the
ultimate clarity regarding what is required (and what, in large part, the parties
and courts are already doing). More broadly, academic discourse regarding
procedural rules can and should account for the realities of litigation practice
and human behavior. By modifying the methodology of how we evaluate rule
changes to consider the rules in the context of how they work in practice,
better rules will be drafted and more useful amendments will be made.
147. Wright & Reasoner, supra note 9, at 125.
148. Id.
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